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I. INTRODUCTION
The adaptation and application of judicial procedures to arbitra-
tion have long been subjects of vital concern and lively controversy.
This remains particularly true with regard to the utilization of arbi-
tration for the adjudication of labor-management disputes.1 It is
asserted, generally by non-lawyers, that the introduction to labor
arbitration proceedings of legal procedures such as prehearing tech-
niques, formalized submission agreements, adoption of rules of
evidence, application of precedent, reliance on transcripts, briefs and
the like, prolong the proceedings, increase the costs and too often
enmesh the merits of the dispute in legal technicalities which becloud
the real issues. Simultaneously, it is maintained, most often by law-
yers, that similar defects in arbitration proceedings are attributed
to the failure of arbitrators to employ legal procedures sufficiently in
the arbitral process.
2
Apart from the relative merits of the respective advocates' argu-
ments, recent litigation and legislation point toward a'greater degree
of formalization and increased reliance on judicial procedures in the
arbitral process. Judicial endorsement of arbitration as an intrinsic
part of our national labor policy has been a paramount factor in
this trend. Commencing with Textileworkers v. Lincoln Mills, 4 and
followed by the oft-cited Steelworkers trilogy5 and a series of land-
* B.S., 1937; M.S., 1939, University of California at Berkeley. Lecturer on Labor
Law, University of California, Extension Division, 1949-1952. Member, State Bar of
California; Member, National Academy of Arbitrators.
1 See generally M. BEATTY, LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION MANUAL (1960);
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1960); R. FLEMING, THE
LABOR ARBITRATION PRocEss (1965); S. KAGEL, ANATOMY OF A LABOR ARBITRATION
(1961); PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (D. Jones ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION]; Aaron, Some Procedural
Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REV. 733 (1957); Jones, Evidentiary Concepts
in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations on Ancient Legal Themes, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1241 (1966).
2 R. FLFMNG, supra note 1, at 57-59.
3 See P. PRAsow & E. PETERS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES, INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, U.C.L.A.
(1967).
4 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
1
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mark decisions thereafter," the United States Supreme Court has,
during the past decade, mandated the courts to enforce arbitration
agreements and awards and has formulated the interrelationship of
the judicial and arbitral processes with particular reference to the
scope of review. In delineating the respective jurisdictions of the judge
and the arbitrator, and in allocating functions and responsibilities,
the Court has emphasized, in most extravagant terms, the especial
expertise of the arbitrator and has restricted correspondingly the
reviewing prerogatives of the judge.7
While the precise line of demarcation on "substantive" matters
remains hazy and indistinct, little obscurity exists in the division
of jurisdiction on procedural questions. Here the Court unequiv-
ocally acknowledges the preeminence of the arbitrator. Recogni-
tion of his paramount role should free the arbitrator from any
compulsion to emulate or "ape" the judges. Paradoxically, in some
cases, the contrary seems to be the case. Arbitrators with a proclivity
to articulate their decisions in the lexicon of the law, perhaps un-
consciously with an eye on the reviewing judge and an intuitive
sense that their awards will more likely be sustained if clothed in
familiar legal jargon, have been encouraged in this regard. Such
tendency has perhaps been further fortified by the increase in state
arbitration statutes providing for enforcement and thus, limited re-
view by state judges.'
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
6 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650 (1965); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Carey
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962); Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962);
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters' Union v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962).
7 "The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say
on the merits of the awards." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567-68 (1960) (parties bargained for judgment of arbitrator, therefore, courts
should not consider merits of award); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203
(1956) (record of arbitration hearing not as complete as record of trial court's proceed-
ings, therefore, judicial review of award more limited than judicial review of trial
court's judgment); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (arbitration awards made
without detailed report of either proceedings or reasoning, therefore, interpretations
of law by arbitrators are not subject to judicial review for error in federal courts).
8 And as postulated in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557
(1964), "procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final
disposition should be left to the arbitrator."
9 There are approximately 25 states which now have arbitration statutes providing
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If there is a discernible trend toward greater formalism and legal-
ism in the arbitral process, resulting from judicial and legislative
sanction of arbitration, with a disposition to emphasize the reviewing
powers of the courts rather than their circumscription, this is indeed
an unfortunate turn of events. Not only will the full thrust of the
Supreme Court's decisions be thwarted, but the arbitral process may
be irreparably damaged. This is not to suggest that arbitrators should
not look to the courts for procedural rules and techniques as a guide;
to the contrary, these techniques represent, in part at least, time tested
devices to arrive at the truth, thereby assuring just and equitable
deisions. What is stressed is the manifestly obvious and ot-reiterated
fact that the arbitral process is intrinsically different from the judicial.
In addition, the arbitral process must remain fluid and flexible since
it is consensual in origin and because its survival is dependent upon
its effectiveness in serving the needs of the parties.
II. PREHEARING PROCEDURES
Prehearing procedures and techniques afford a most fertile field
for the ingenious and imaginative arbitrator interested in improving
the arbitral process. For some time pretrial procedures have been
employed by the federal courts,'0 and a number of states, in varying
degrees, have adopted some form of pretrial system."
The principal objective of pretrial procedures is to improve the
adversary system, to do away with the "sporting theory of justice-
namely, surprise at the trial."'12 As noted by one California court, it is
designed "to relieve the members of the legal profession and the
members of the judiciary from legal technicalities, trivia, detail and
for some form of enforcement. See 5 Am. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 10 at 527
(1962); AM, JUR. 2d DESK BOOK Doc. No. 129 at 319 (1962) & DESK BOOK Doc.
No. 129 at 86 (Supp. 1967).
10 See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (-1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947); Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. Y. Baker-Whitely Towing,
Co., 42 P.R.D. 12 (1967) (enlarged deposition-discovery rules); FED. R. CV.- P. 16
(pretrial conference within court's discretion).
11 E.g., ARIz. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 16(a) (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(16),
(1953); PA. RULES Cv. PRoc. 212, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 (Purdon 1967); Wis.
STAT. § 269.65 (1965). See Case v. Abrams, 352 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1965); Jenlns
v. Devine Foods, 3 N.J. 450, 70 A.2d 736 (1950) (binding.effect of order of the
court entered after mandatory pretrial conference); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE TRIAl. COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 201-36 (1952)" (chs. XIV Discovery
and Inspection & XV The Pre-Trial Hearing).
12 Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 103,
364 P.2d 266, 279 (1961). See generally Louisell, Discovery and Pre-trial under the
Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 633 (1952); Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CALIF.
L. REV.,'486'(1957); 4 MooRf's FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 2602(2), 2624.
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unessentials"'14 and, as stated by another California court, the aim of
this procedure is "to place the case in focus so that the defined and
precise issues may be resolved as quickly as possible."'14 To the degree
that pretrial procedures can be adapted by arbitrators to expedite the
resolution of issues, with attendant reductions in costs, it accords with
the underlying objectives and purposes of the arbitration process.
No uniform or inflexible rule can be postulated for prehearing
procedures in arbitration proceedings. The extent to which an arbitra-
tor may choose to advocate the utilization of prehearing procedures-
whether prehearing statements or briefs, prehearing conferences or
one of the other discovery devices-will necessarily depend upon a
variety of factors: the type of the proceeding, the complexity of the
issues, the nature of evidence to be adduced, the relationship of the
parties, the professional skill of the advocates, and the time to be
consumed in hearing the dispute. Since pretrial procedures depend
upon the judge or hearing officer for effective application, it must
always rest with the arbitrator, based on his knowledge, experience
and especial expertise, to determine what forms of and to what de-
gree prehearing procedures may be advantageous.
Certain general considerations, however, may be noted. First, the
arbitrator may propose a prehearing conference to discuss prelim-
inary matters and iron out the ground rules, and to familiarize himself
more fully with the issues.
Second, it would appear that prehearing procedures are more
likely to be profitably employed in grievance disputes or arbitration
of rights, i.e., those- involving the interpretation or application of
laws, agreements, or customary practices, rather than in contract
negotiation disputes or arbitration of interests, i.e., those concerning
questions of the basic terms and conditions of employment. In the
latter case 'the parties have probably been in negotiations for a sub-
stantial period of time, federal or state conciliators have frequently
participated in some stages of the negotiations, and the economic or
other factual justifications for the proposals will have been fully
explored.
-Third, even within the context of contract interpretation or griev-
ance arbitration, it would appear that pretrial procedures have vary-
ing degrees of effectiveness, depending again upon the circumstances
13 Baird v. Hodson, 161 Cal. App. 2d. 687, 689, 327 P.2d 215, 217 (1958).
14 Fitzsimmons v. Jones; 179 Cal. App. 2d 5, 8, 3 Cal. Rptr. 373, 375 (1 60).
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of the particular proceeding. It may be argued that the need for a
prehearing is less compelling where there is a well-established,
sophisticated, permanent umpire system'5 with adequate grievance
procedures and knowledgeable personnel, who are committed to
explore all of the facts and who strive to settle the dispute before
submitting it to arbitration. Moreover, where the umpire has a long-
standing relationship with the parties and is knowledgeable as to
plant practices and contractual provisions, prehearing may have even
more limited value. Interestingly enough, however, at General Motors
and U.S. Steel, each of which is recognized as having a superior
umpire system, each side prepares and submits statements to the
umpire prior to the hearing 6
Fourth, it is in ad hoc grievance arbitration, where pretrial pro-
cedures are most infrequently employed, that they could well serve
their most useful function.'7 The arbitrator is often unacquainted with
the parties, the plant practices and the provisions of the contract. In
addition, it is more likely that the parties who resort to ad hoc
arbitration as the final step will have less sophisticated grievance
procedures and will be advocates neither as knowledgeable nor as
experienced as those parties to a permanent umpire system.
A. Submission Agreement
Any consideration of prehearing techniques in arbitration must take
note of the submission agreement, an instrument unique to the
arbitral process. Unlike established legal procedure wherein plead-
ings designed to "join the issue" are a prerequisite to trial, pleadings
are rarely employed in arbitration. Arbitrators and practitioners have
developed in their stead the submission agreement which sets forth
with specificity the issue to be decided.
While the submission agreement does not normally contain the
elements of a technical pleading-ultimate facts, material allegations,
relief requested-it frequently does provide for such matters as the
scope of the arbitrator's authority, procedural rules to govern the
15 Under a permanent umpire system an impartial third party is designated by the
collective bargaining agreement as arbitrator for all disputes arising during the contract
period. Under an ad hoc arbitration system, the contract merely provides a system for
selecting an arbitrator for each grievance as it arises.
Arbitrators and umpires possess only those powers conferred upon them by the
agreement of submission; they have no power to do what the parties themselves could
not do by agreement. 5 Am. JuR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 90 (1962).
16 R. F.rENG, supra note 1, at 62.
17 Id. at 66.
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hearing and the binding effect of the award. On occasion, the agree-
ment may also include stipulations of fact.
In interest disputes, with the exception of the relatively few agree-
ments which provide for arbitration where the parties cannot resolve
their differences in negotiations, a submission agreement is a pre-
requisite to the hearing. In rights arbitrations, it is sometimes sug-
gested that the submission agreement is an undue formality and that
the written grievance'8 or grievance minutes 9 might suffice. The point
is well taken except in those cases dealing with highly structured griev-
ance provisions that incorporate, in substance, the elements of a sub-
mission agreement. The consequences of an improperly drafted
grievance or submission agreement (e.g., possible vacation of an
award by the courts for an arbitrator exceeding his authority) would
,opt for utilization and formulation of such agreements with care and
precision. Even then, just as the courts have found that the modern
and revised rules of pleading are sometimes inadequate to inform the
'parties of the nature of the law suit and to enable them to adequately
prepare for trial, the submission agreement, even where expertly and
skillfully drawn, at times has proved to be an inadequate substitute
for other prehearing techniques.
B. Prehearing Statement or Brief
The submission by the parties of a prehearing statement or brief,
in addition to a submission agreement, provides a twofold advantage:
it obliges the parties more thoroughly to analyze their case in order
.to submit it in writing; and it acquaints the arbitrator with the matters
to be considered at the hearing. The former has the beneficial effect
of pointing up the strengths and weaknesses of the case and may lead
to its withdrawal or settlement. The latter enables the arbitrator to
'sharpen the issues, to explore settlement and, in the event of a hear-
ing, to probe more fully into every facet of the case so that all relevant
evidence will be adduced to provide a full and complete record upon
which he may rule. 'While the pretrial statement or brief lacks many
of the beneficial attributes of the pretrial conference, it has the ad-
vantage of avoiding' additional meetings, an economy which. the
parties may desire.
Is A written grievance is a statement of the claim by the aggrieved party, usually
referring to the clause in the contract'which the aggrieved party claims was violated.
19 Grievance minutes are written records of the meetings between uni6n and
management which constitute the preliminary steps of the grievance procedure.'
[Vol. 5
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C. Prehearing Conference
The prehearing conference is probably most effective if held two or
three weeks prior to the hearing,20 and if properly employed, the con-
ference can be a most important tool in expediting the more complex
and potentially time consuming cases.
First, it affords the arbitrator the opportunity to analyze with the
parties the issues in dispute and to articulate and define them with
maximum precision. Thus, this part of the prehearing conference has
several attendant advantages: It limits the scope of the proceedings
by curtailing the introduction of irrelevant and immaterial evidence;
it defines the jurisdiction of the arbitrator so that, should his award
be challenged in the courts, it is more likely to be affirmed; and, like
the prehearing brief, it enables the parties to evaluate the strength
and weakness of their case.
Second, the prehearing conference permits the arbitrator to examine
with the parties the theories of their case, their claims, their argu-
ments and their defenses. This examination similarly has concomitant
advantages. If the case is presented by laymen who possess neither
extensive experience nor special expertise, it can put in focus the
major arguments which they should be prepared to advance and to
meet. If, however, the case is to be presented by professional advo-
cates-lawyers, economists or, as is sometimes the case, personnel in
the union or management hierarchies who may not have participated
in the lower steps of the grievance procedure-this part of the pre-
hearing conference may present them with their first opportunity to
meet with their adversaries.
Third, the arbitrator is enabled to explore with the parties evi-
dentiary matters, including the ground rules Or rules of evidence to
be applied in the hearing. The application of liberal rules of evidence
subjects the arbitrator to criticism, and with some justification, for
permitting the introduction of evidence which is neither relevant nor
otherwise proper. Promulgation of the rules to be applied, and an
explanation of their underlying considerations may be helpful in
sharpening the presentations and in expediting the proceedings if
the advocates are laymen.
Fourth, the prehearing conference, to a substantially greater degree
20 Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Pederal judges, 4 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1946);
see also, Louisell, Discovery And Pretrial Under Minn. Rules, 36 MfN. L. REv.
633, 655 (1952).
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than the prehearing brief, enables the arbitrator to educate and famil-
iarize himself with the issues, the arguments, the pertinent documents
and the evidence intended to be introduced. Too frequently arbitrators
are not sufficiently prepared in advance to assure that a full and
complete record is made at the hearing. Deficiencies in the record
may not become apparent to the arbitrator until he analyzes the
evidence in preparation of his decision and, since arbitrators are
reluctant to call meetings of the parties after the matter has been
submitted, pretrial conferences may prevent an incomplete record.
Fifth, in any arbitration, the narrowing of issues, the exploration
of theories and the examination of contemplated evidence at the
prehearing conference enable the arbitrator to explore knowledgeably
all avenues of settlement and, if the arbitration must proceed, to
conduct the hearing expeditiously.
D. Discovery
There is less than complete agreement as to the usefulness in
arbitration of discovery devices, e.g., depositions, interrogatories, mo-
tions for inspection or production of documents, and requests for ad-
missions of fact and genuineness of documents. Yet there can be little
question as to the soundness of the underlying objectives in enabling
the parties to have access to the facts, so that they will be neithertsurprised' at the hearing nor required to expend unnecessary time
and money in preparation of nonessential proof.
The intrinsic value of disclosure between the parties, not only as
to their positions but also as to the evidence, is, in some respects, far
more significant in aribitration than in civil litigation. For example,
the labor-management relationship is necessarily continuous, and
it can be severely damaged if it is believed that any arbitration case
was won by trickery, by suppressing evidence, or by introducing sur-
prise evidence. Any suspicion on the part of either management or
the union, and more particularly on the part of the employees, that
the decision was based upon anything other than complete disclosure
of the facts, will unquestionably result in a loss of confidence in the
arbitration process, with detrimental consequences to its future utiliza-
tion.
Occasionally, one of the parties may withhold information in the
grievance steps for the advantage of introducing it as "surprise" evi-
dence at the hearing. Such a strategem runs contrary to the purpose
[Vol. 5
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of the grievance procedure, for the collective bargaining agreement
implies an obligation to make disclosures. It should be discouraged.
Presumably, discovery devices, in conjunction with prehearing con-
ferences, would extract most if not all of the evidence, notably if the
arbitrator were to exclude evidence at the hearing which had been
withheld during discovery or prehearing conferences. Finally, the
requirement that the parties exchange relevant information in ad-
vance of the hearing accords with our national labor policy. Both the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts have recognized the
employer's duty to disclose fully to union representatives information
and facts so as to enable them, not merely to bargain intelligently,
but to discharge properly their statutory duty of fair representation
which includes the administration of the agreement and the handling
of grievances.2 '
Clearly, not all of the discovery devices lend themselves equally
well to arbitration, nor, more significantly, are any of them especially
functional if employed in the formalistic manner used in judicial
proceedings. Depositions, for example, appear to be neither useful
nor adaptable to the arbitration process. Too often, even in judicial
proceedings, they are employed to harass the adversary, to engage in
"fishing expeditions" and to prolong and increase the cost of litiga-
tion. Similar evils attach when depositions are adapted to the arbitral
process.
Conversely, interrogatories can be adapted to great advantage in
some arbitration proceedings. Interrogatories could be addressed
directly to the adverse party, and if he should choose not to respond
to any or all of the questions the arbitrator could, prior to the hear-
ing, indicate his views on the matter. In the alternative, the inter-
rogatories could be directed to the arbitrator, who would select the
proper questions and send them to the party for response. Such a
procedure could be particularly helpful in discharge cases where the
cause of the discharge is not readily apparent or where the evidence
in support thereof has not been completely revealed. As an instance,
if a company discharges an employee for dishonesty on the basis
of an investigator's reports, detailed information sent to the union
in advance of the hearing could result either in the union's with-
21 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188-95 (1967); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Company, 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967); NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266
F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1967) ("[tWhe Board may require an employer to furnish the
addresses of its employees for the purpose of conducting a representation election").
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drawing the grievance or its being prepared to meet the allegations
in the case.
The production of documents in advance of the hearing also would
appear to be meritorious. Inordinate amounts of time are commonly
consumed in hearings by the rambling of one of the parties who is
unprepared to cross-examine on submitted documents that he has not
previously seen. An opportunity for the parties to study and analyze
such documents in advance can save time. Stipulations of fact and
stipulations as to genuineness of documents, if obtained at the pre-
hearing conference, also can aid the expedition of the arbitration
hearing.
III. HEARING PROCEDURES
Even before the Supreme Court acknowledged his paramount
position in procedural matters, the arbitrator was recognized as the
key figure in the development of procedural ground rules for arbitral
practice.22 At the same time, the past three decades have witnessed a
transformation in his role.
Unlike the pre-World War II arbitrator, who practiced a mixed
"mediation" and "arbitration," and whose decision frequently repre-
sented a consensus arrived at through compromise and persuasion,
the contemporary arbitrator, especially in rights disputes, is looked to
for adjudication of the "mutual intent" of the parties as manifested
(implicitly or explicitly) by their collective bargaining agreement.
The present and more circumscribed view of the arbitrator's function,
though not universally endorsed, draws some support from recent
expressions of the Supreme Court. As articulated by the Court in
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation:
[A] n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.23
Conceding the axiom that the arbitrator's jurisdiction and authority
22 W. Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND TaH PARTIES,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL AcADEMY OF ARBI -
TRATOVs 1 (J. McKelvey ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as W. Wirtz].
23 563 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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flow from agreement by the parties and may be delimited by them as
they see fit, there is an inherent danger to the arbitral process in
overreading the Court's language and failing to construe it in the
context of the Court's earlier admonition of the arbitrator's pre-
eminence on procedural matters.
Limitations on the arbitrator's jurisdiction, unless explicitly ex-
pressed to the contrary, are not to be equated with restraints on his
authority to determine procedural questions nor with inhibitions on
his initiative to innovate in the procedural field. To the contrary, his
is the prime responsibility for fixing ground rules for the hearing, for
assuring a full and complete record, for maintaining an orderly pro-
ceeding, and for protecting the parties and witnesses from improper
behavior. Above all, he must conduct the hearing in a manner cal-
culated to balance the individual and institutional interests and de-
signed to accomodate the oftentimes divergent precepts of due pro-
cess 24 and expeditious hearing.
A. Participation in the Hearing
The right of an individual or institution, having an interest in or
potentially affected by the outcome of judicial proceedings, to notice
of and participation in the hearings to the extent necessary to protect
his or its interests is traditionally recognized. Acknowledgement of
this right was probably the underlying basis for the statutory creation
of the legal motions of intervention25 and interpleader.
26
No statutory equivalent exists in the field of labor arbitration.
24 Conceptual definitions of due process have historically intrigued philosophers,
political theoreticians and legal scholars. So elusive is a definitive characterization of this
concept, however, that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to define
"due process of law" as an abstract doctrine. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442
(1960). Chief Justice Warren writing for the majority states, "'[djue process' is an
elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according
to specific factual contexts." See also Rochin v. Calif., 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Wolf
v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949);
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928).
Procedural due process, however, is somewhat less difficult of description. It denotes
a "full and fair hearing," the right of an individual to his "day in court." It embraces
at the very least, the rights to notice, to be present, to participate in the hearings, to
confront witnesses and cross-examine them, and to refuse, under certain circumstances,
to give testimony. Just as these are fundamental to the judicial process, so they are
equally, albeit in modified form, basic to arbitration procedure. See W. Wirtz, supra
note 22.
25 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 24; CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 387 (West 1954); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 26.1 (1956).
26 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 22; CAL. CODE Cirv. P. § 386 (West 1954); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 26.2 (1956).
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Nonetheless, proceedings do occur in which the arbitrator's award
may substantially, and in many cases adversely, affect the rights of
third parties. Three such situations shall be briefly noted: (1) par-
ticipation by and representation of the grievant; (2) intervention by
other employees whose job status may be affected; and (3) joinder
of other unions, the contractual rights of which might be involved.
1. Employees as Grievants
Normally, the employer and the union are the formal parties to
grievance or rights arbitration proceedings. The grievant usually
participates in the capacity of a witness rather than as an advocate,
with the presentation being made by his collective bargaining repre-
sentative, i.e., the union. The union, as a party to the agreement,
asserts concurrently the institutional and the individual interests.
On occasion, however, the grievant is persuaded or believes that the
union is antagonistic to his position or will not adequately represent
him.
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Vaca v.
Sipes" definitively determines the absence of obligation on the part
of the union to pursue a grievance to arbitration on behalf of an
employee which the union "in good faith" concludes is without
merit. But, the decision left unsettled the extent to which the indi-
vidual is entitled, where the grievance is prosecuted, to full and
separate participation in the arbitration hearing including representa-
tion by counsel of his own choosing. Dialogue by arbitrators on this
subject has been substantial ;28 adjudication has been sparse.
In general, there appears a discernible disposition on the part of
arbitrators to permit the grievant full participation in the hearing,
but somewhat less enthusiastic response to that of allowing separate
counsel. Owing to the fact that constitutional due process does not
embrace the right to counsel before private tribunals, such bodies may
establish their own procedural rules.29 Notwithstanding the above,
27 386 U.S. 171, 190, 194 (1967) (breach of union's statutory duty of fair repre.
sentation occurs only when union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargain-
ing unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith; union, as employee's statutory
agent, must make good faith, nonarbitrary decisions as to merits of particular
grievances).
28 W. Wirtz, supra note 22, at 25; Barbash, Due Process and Individual Pghts in
Arbitration, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE
ON LABOR 7 (G. Christensen ed. 1964).
29 See Smith v. General Truck Drivers, Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14, 20 (S.D. Cal.
1960).
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fair procedures, at least as viewed by the Nation Labor Relations
Board for purposes of effectuating its policy of deference to arbitra-
tion awards, may under certain circumstances entail the prerogative
of one's own lawyer at the hearing. 0
Separate representation of the grievant in arbitration hearings
represents a further instance of harmonizing institutional and indi-
vidual interests. Whether separate representation is to be allowed may
turn on the reasonable belief in or the evidence supporting an
allegation that the grievant will not receive full and fair representa-
tion by his collective bargaining agent. Thus, in a recent case, the
arbitrator denied the grievant's request for separate counsel, finding
that there was no showing that the union would not fairly or ade-
quately represent him.31 On this ground the arbitrator distinguished
the ruling of a New Jersey court which held that an employee was
entitled to intervene with his own counsel upon showing that the
union was acting adversely to his interests. 32 Since neither Section
9 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,33 which permits the
individual to process his own grievance under certain conditions, nor
constitutional due process requires that the grievant be afforded
separate counsel, the arbitrator has little in the way of objective
criteria to aid him in this determination.
2. Intervention by Other Employees
A related although factually distinguishable situation, posing
substantially the same question to the arbitrator, arises where an
employee or group of employees who are not grievants, may never-
theless be adversely affected by a decision of the arbitrator. Such a
situation most commonly occurs in connection with seniority cases
30 Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964) (Board's holding on fairness criticized but not
reversed); see Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763, 50 L.R.R.M. 1495 (1962).
31 Yale Transport, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 736 (1963).
32 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 NJ. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
33 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr OF 1947 (TAFT-HARTLEY Acr) § 9(a),
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1965) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representatives, as long as the adjustment
is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agree-
ment then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
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but may arise in arbitrations involving work assignments, filling of
temporary vacancies, vacation scheduling, or distribution of overtime
work.
For the first time, the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Moore84
postulated its view in the context of a group of employees who were
disadvantaged by the "dovetailing" of seniority lists. Factually, Com-
pany A had taken over the operations of Company B and had pro-
ceeded to lay off the latter company's employees, some of whom
filed grievances under a multi-employer multi-union Teamster con-
tract that covered both employers. The grievants contended that the
seniority lists of the two companies should be merged or dovetailed.
At the final step of the grievance procedure, a joint committee made
up of an equal number of union and employer representatives ruled
that it had the authority to interpret the contract on this question and
that the merging of seniority lists was appropriate. The joint ruling
accorded with the position taken by the union at the committee
hearing. Thereafter, employees of Company A, who were laid off as
a result of the dovetailing, filed an action in the state court and were
granted an injunction to prevent the joint ruling from being given
effect. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
Several far reaching issues were involved, and four separate
opinions were filed by the Justices. Of present significance is the view
of the majority that the union did not breach its duty of fair repre-
sentation where: (1) in good faith, it espoused the interests of one
of the two competing groups of employees that it represented; and
(2) the complaining employees-who were not grievants in the
original dispute since under the company's interpretation they had
initially retained their positions-were notified and present at the
hearing and "were given every opportunity to state their position."3
The majority noted further that these employees:
made no request to continue the hearing until they could secure
further representation and have not yet suggested what they could
have added to the hearing by way of facts or theory if they had been
differently represented.36
Participation in the hearings was, perhaps, not essential to the
Court's determination. Fundamental to future arbitration procedure,
nonetheless, is the supposition implicit in the majority's language
34 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
35 Id. at 350.
36 Id. at 350-51.
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that failure to notify and afford the complaining parties the oppor-
tunity to participate might have led the Court to a different result.
It does not follow from the Humphrey case that an employee must
be permitted to intervene in the hearing each time he may be dis-
advantaged by an arbitrator's decision. Always allowing an employee
to intervene is shown to be impractical when it is recognized that the
affirmance of his rights may adversely affect the rights of others.
Furthermore, it does not follow from Humphrey that a group of
employees whose interests are antagonistic to the position of their
collective bargaining representative must always be joined. In denying
a group of dissident employees the right to participate in arbitration
proceedings, Professor Jones, the arbitrator, stated:
Procedures are evolving which equip arbitrators to enable joinder
of those whose interests might otherwise be impaired unless they can
participate in some form in the arbitration. But joinder techniques
do not operate inexorably nor without heed to their appropriateness
in the specific circumstances. Quite the contrary. Arbitral joinder
techniques are only appropriate in those circumstances where the
failure to effectuate joinder would cause patent injustice, given the
reality either of a bilateral decision in a multilateral dispute which
might be significantly dispositive of third-party rights, or the pros-
pect of an undue extension of indecision by the postponement of the
resolution of a multilateral dispute.37
Decisions based on the foregoing types of situations present the
dual problem to the arbitrator of harmonizing individual and in-
stitutional interests and of balancing the philosophical concepts of
due process with pragmatic considerations of orderly and expeditious
grievance arbitration proceedings. To achieve harmony and balance
functionally rather than conceptually, it is suggested that only in
those limited situations, where it is evident to the arbitrator that a
full and fair hearing cannot ensue without separate representation
by the grievant or intervention by adversely affected employees,
should such requests to participate be granted. To do otherwise is to
intrude on the institutional interest and statutory obligation of the
union to represent its members, thereby hampering unduly the
arbitral process. So long as the grievant or disadvantaged employees
have other avenues by which to pursue the remedies of "fair repre-
sentations," they should be left to such forums.38
37 Maier Brewing Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1115, 1122 (1965) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
38 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Independent Metal Wkrs. Local 1, 147
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3. Unions as Grievants
The decision of the Supreme Court in Carey v. Westinghouse
Electric Corporation9 poses to the arbitrator yet another procedural
dilemma. In the Carey case, a majority of the Court held that the
jurisdiction of the NLRB to resolve work assignment disputes and to
determine appropriate bargaining units of employees does not pre-
clude the use of the arbitration procedure to resolve one union's
grievance that the work covered by its bargaining unit, incorporated
in its agreement with the employer, was being performed by em-
ployees represented by another union.
Factually, the IUE40 filed a grievance asserting that certain em-
ployees in the engineering laboratory at the Westinghouse plant, who
were represented by another union which had been certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative for a unit of "all salaried, tech-
nical employees," were performing production and maintenance
work. UE was the certified collective bargaining representative for
all "production and maintenance employees" and had incorporated
its unit certification into the collective bargaining agreement. Upon
Westinghouse's refusal to arbitrate, on the ground that the con-
troversy presented a representation matter for the NLRB, the WE
petitioned the state court for an order directing arbitration. The
petition was refused41 and the intermediate appellate courts af-
firmed; 42 the Supreme Court reversed.
The Carey decision compels arbitration between an employer and a
grieving union on jurisdictional matters, despite the absence of a
second union's participation in the hearing and even though the
second union's institutional interest of representation along with the
scope of its collective bargaining agreement may be placed in jeop-
ardy. Additionally, the decision propounds the question of what mea-
sures the arbitrator might invoke to persuade or compel all parties to
join in the arbitration so that the ultimate decision will be binding on
the employer as well as on each of the unions, and that the adjudica-
tion will be finally determinative of the jurisdictional issue involved.
A series of law review articles has already explored this subject
N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964). Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181,
51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
39 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
40 International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.
41 15 App. Div. 2d 7, 221 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1961).
2 11 N.Y. 2d 452, 184 N.E.2d 298, 230 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1962).
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in depth.43 Suffice it, therefore, to direct the reader to the provocative
dialogue between two scholars in the field, Professor Jones of UCLA
and Professor Bernstein of Ohio State University. Professor Jones
advances an imaginative and comprehensive proposal designed to
bring about through "consent and compulsion" the inclusion of a
non-participating union in the proceeding.44 Professor Bernstein's
opposition proceeds primarily on the incompatibility of a coercive
force with the consensual nature of the arbitral process.45
Thus far, arbitrators have displayed little inclination to adopt pro-
cedures designed to compel the second union to participate. Unions'
declinations to transform bilateral arbitration into trilateral proceed-
ings have generally been followed by the arbitrator's going forward
with only the two primary parties to the grievance.46 The arbitrators'
acquiescence may be due to a disinclination to resort to compulsion or
a reasoned conclusion that they are without the requisite authority.
As noted by Arbitrator Block in a recent ruling,47 where, after an
analysis of the applicable California statutory law and the Supreme
Court's decisions in Carey and Wiley48 and a review of the major
48 Berstein, Jurisdictional Dispute Arbitration: The Jostling Professors, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 347 (1966); Berstein, Nudging and Shoving All Parties to a Jurisdictional Dis-
pute into Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of National Steel, 78 HARv. L. REV. 784
(1965); Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REv.
883 (1962); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 McIH. L. REv. 635
(1959); Jones, On Nudging and Shoving the National Steel Arbitration into a Dubious
Procedure, 79 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1965); Jones, Power and Prudence in the Arbitration
of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Some Hypotheses, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 675 (1964);
Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The Carey Decision and Trilateral
Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disputes, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 327 (1964); Jones, Auto-
biography of a Decision: The Function of Innovation in Labor Arbitration, and the
National Steel Orders of Joinder and Interpleader, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 987 (1963).
44 Jones, Compulsion and the Consensual in Labor Arbitration, 51 VA. L. REV. 369,
377 (1965).
45 Bernstein, Nudging and Shoving All Parties to a Jurisdictional Dispute into
Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of National Steel, 78 HARv. L. REV. 784, 786
(1965).
46 See, e.g., Lockheed-California Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 865 (1966); Thorsen Mfg. Co.,
44 Lab. Arb. 1049 (1965); E. R. Wagner Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 210 (1964).
47 Lockheed-California Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 865 (1966).
48 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) as cited in Lockheed-
California Co., 46 Lab. .rb. 865, 869-70 (1966). In Lockheed the Company argued
that the question of joinder was a procedural matter which should be left to the discre-
tion of the arbitrator, basing its assertion on the following quotation from Wiley:
Once it is determined, as we have, that the parties are obligated to submit
the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, "procedural" questions which
grow out of dispute and bear on the final disposition should be left to the
arbitrator [376 U.S. at 557].
However, the arbitrator, after careful consideration of Wiley and Carey, ruled "they do
not open the door to joinder by him."
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literature on the subject, he rejected a company's motion to join the
second union:
Here, as in Carey, bilateral arbitration is being sought by one
union (the I.A.M.) in a jurisdictional work dispute situation.
While the ensuing arbitration on the merits may or may not end
the controversy, the Arbitrator is unable to construe the above U.S.
Supreme Court decisions as sanctioning joinder by him of the
Welders Union in this case.
In conclusion, it is the Arbitrator's opinion that there is neither
case law, statutory nor contractual authority for granting the Com-
pany's motion.4
9
While students of the subject imbued with Professor Bernstein's
voluntary or consensual nature of the arbitral process 0 may find
Professor Jones' proposed solution unpalatable, the dilemma posed by
the Carey decision damors for solution. The practicalities of the
labor-management relationship, as well as due process considerations,
will require further experimentation and innovation on the part of
arbitrators to evolve procedures by which such jurisdictional questions
may be adjudicated with finality and with all parties afforded the
opportunity to participate.
B. Due Process Considerations
1. Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses
The right of the grievant and his representative to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses presents still another area of accom-
modation for the arbitrator, that of balancing this concept with the
procedural principle of relaxed rules of evidence for arbitration.
Employers' requests, that grievants be excluded from the arbitration
hearing on the ground that appearances of witnesses should be
limited to the time when they testify, have met with no success. The
rationale is that exclusion of grievants is "tantamount to a denial of
due process... akin to excluding a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing from his own trial."51
40 Lockheed-California Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 865, 870 (1966).
50 Berstein, jurisdictional Dispute Arbitration: The Jostling Professors, 14 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 347, 351 (1966). Professor Bernstein defines the voluntary or consensual nature
of the arbitral process as:
the freedom of the parties to shape their procedures and decisional criteria
to meet their needs, the freedom to prescribe the method of selecting arbitra-
tors, and the finality of awards free from court review (except for blatant
departures from procedural decencies) ....
51 International Smelting & Refining Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 885, 886 (1965).
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However, far less unanimity exists among arbitrators with respect
to the employer's obligation to produce as witnesses for cross-ex-
amination such individuals as spotters, shoppers and private detec-
tives upon whose reports disciplinary or discharge action is based.
Here the arbitrator must weigh the traditional right to face one's
accuser, which affords the opportunity for cross-examination for
credibility and impeachment purposes, against the employer's in-
stitutional interests in maintaining his investigators' anonymity.
As might be anticipated, arbitrators' views on this question are
multifarious; some exclude the testimony as hearsay, others admit it
with the customary admonition that "it will receive its proper
weight," and still others strive for a middle ground where they in-
terview the investigator without any of the parties being present to
determine the reliability of the report.52 There appears to be little
basis for reconciling these divergent views other than the personal
predilections of the arbitrators. What is discernible in this area,
however, is the increasing concern on the part of the arbitration pro-
fession for more procedural protection to the individual involved.
5 3
Court review will undoubtedly bring to bear more pressure in this
regard.
A related form of "absentee" evidence stems from the custom and
practice in a number of industries of not calling witnesses from the
other side, viz., the employer does not call bargaining unit employees,
the union does not call foremen or others in the managerial hier-
archy. This practice stems from an assumption that if unfavorable or
adverse testimony is given by such witnesses then some form of
retribution will ensue.
The dilemma of the arbitrator in such cases centers about develop-
ing a full and complete record, since in many instances such testi-
mony would prove helpful, if not determinative, to a resolution of
factual conflicts. Many arbitrators are of the opinion that there is
little legitimate justification for this practice. As a result, there has
been a disposition to circumvent it either by interviewing witnesses
in private, which has the undesired effect of making the arbitrator an
independent investigator rather than a trier of fact, or by the arbitra-
tor's calling the witnesses himself.54 While the arbitrator has the legal
power to compel attendance only by subpoena, which is now provided
52 See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 183-84.
53 See W. Wirtz, supra note 22, at 25.
54 See PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ARBrrRATION, supra note 1, at 258.
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for in some twenty-six states, " there are other practical measures he
can employ to accomplish this objective. As the decision maker,
reasonable requests by him for the production of witnesses are likely
to be honored.
2. Search and Seizure
Other due process considerations relate to the manner in which
the evidence is obtained, e.g., confidential records of the company are
invaded, memoranda are taken from wastebaskets, items are "found"
in employees' lockers and, increasingly, evidence is acquired through
the use of movie, television or recording equipment. While the courts
have steadfastly refused to admit evidence tainted by a questionable
search and seizure, the question whether identical exclusionary prin-
ciples should prevail in the arbitral process remains undecided.
The argument can be made that when an individual becomes em-
ployed, he does so subject to management prerogatives and plant
rules, which implicitly include the right to examine his locker or his
automobile without consent or search warrant, or to observe his
activities through picture or electronic devices without his knowledge
or consent. Contrariwise, it can be asserted that the circumstance of
employment should not deprive him of his constitutional rights and
subject him to invasions of his right of privacy and intrusions on his
daily working life. Assuming neither a constitutional right nor an
explicit prohibition in the contract, the question presented to the
arbitrator is whether such methods of obtaining evidence should be
encouraged by admitting it in the hearing. Again divergent views
exist. Some arbitrators hold that so long as its authenticity and
materiality are not questioned, such evidence should be admitted.50
Others adhere to the view that " [k] nowledge, even though incrimi-
nating, if acquired through such illegitimate procedures, is of ques-
tionable validity in bringing action against the individual.""T
Probably the most far reaching and significant questions in this
area will revolve about the admissibility of evidence obtained through
the use of dosed circuit television and electronic instruments. Where
the employee is aware of the utilization of such devices little argu-
ment can be advanced for the inadmissibility of such evidence despite
55 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 10, § 21 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MINN. STATS. ANN.
§ 572.14 (Supp. 1966); TEx. Civ. STATS. art. 230(c) (Vernon's Supp. 1967).
56 See PROBLEMS OF PROOF im ABrrRATION, supra note 1, at 105, 204.
57 Campbell Soup Co., 2 Lab. Atb. 27, 31 (1946).
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the fact that it may "put the employees under constant strain .... r"'
But, where the espionage is conducted under surreptitious conditions,
with the employee unaware that he is being spied upon, it presents
the arbitrator with one facet of the broader social question-the
degree to which invasion of "rights of privacy" will be countenanced
in our contemporary society. There is no rationale for a more restric-
tive interpretation of this guarantee by arbitrators in the industrial
arena than by the judges in our social and political life.
C. Failure or Refusal of a Grievant to Testify
The failure or refusal of the grievant to testify in an arbitration
proceeding may be due to: (1) personality traits, including his
demeanor, emotional instability or inarticulateness, which would
make him a "poor" witness; or (2) his intention to invoke the
"privilege against self-incrimination." In the main, the decisions
indicate a dear consensus that the failure of the grievant to testify at
the hearing is a prime factor which leads to the conclusion that the
grievance is without merit.59
A somewhat different view is suggested where the case involves a
discharge or disciplinary matter. Many arbitrators require a higher
standard of proof in such cases because of the serious consequences,
particularly where the alleged acts entail moral turpitude or cirminal
intent. Here, it may well be contended that the refusal to testify
should be equated with the legal rule barring comment on the failure
of a defendant to testify in a criminal proceeding,60 and that the
grievant's abstention should not be weighed adversely by the arbi-
trator.
The privilege against self-incrimination established in the criminal
law is not, in the opinion of most arbitrators, applicable to the field
of labor arbitration. This proceeds from the assumption that, unlike
68 W. Wirtz, supra note 22, at 17.
59 F. ELKOURI & E. EmLKOURI, supra note 1, at 182 & n.46.
60 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), where the Court stated:
We ... hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal
Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth
Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt (foot-
note omitted).
See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
[A] limited immunity from the common duty to testify was written into the
Federal Bill of Rights, and . . . as part of that immunity, comment on the
failure of an accused to take the witness stand is forbidden in federal prose-
cutions.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
a criminal case, a disciplinary grievance is " 'a matter not to be
viewed primarily as a question of penalty for misconduct, but as a
problem of whether or not, all things considered, the individual has
proved an unsatisfactory employee.' "I'
The increased emphasis by the judiciary on the protection against
self-incrimination may, however, augur a modulation in the arbitra-
tors' predilections in this regard. The statutory trend to vest the
arbitrator with the subpoena power supports the recognition of this
right. The federal courts, in fashioning a body of law under Section
301,2 may well conceive of the protection of this privilege as a con-
dition precedent to enforcement of an arbitration award.
D. Rules of Evidence
Consideration of the effective utilization of specific evidentiary
rules in arbitration must proceed from the premise that strict ad-
herence to judicial rules is incompatible with the arbitral process.
Several factors contribute to this conclusion. First, rules of evidence
evolved as an integral part of the jury system and were designed to
aid laymen in evaluating evidence, but the rules are not always
applied, strictly construed or observed by administrative bodies or in
non-jury trials. Second, rules of evidence are in large measure ex-
clusionary in nature. Yet evidence which is not strictly relevant, or
otherwise proper, may nevertheless be helpful to the arbitrator, par-
ticularly the ad hoc arbitrator, for background and as an aid in de-
termining the mutual intent of the parties. Third, the professional
arbitrator's especial expertise should qualify him to analyze and
weigh the evidence produced within the proper context. Fourth,
reviewing courts are more likely to sustain awards where there has
been liberal admission rather than a rejection of competent, although
technically inadmissible evidence. Fifth, arbitration has a therapeutic
value in the labor-management relationship by enabling the parties to
"get things off their chest" and "have their day in court" which
frequently can be accomplished only by liberal admission of evidence.
Finally, the success of arbitration and its continued acceptance by the
parties are dependent upon its remaining efficient, speedy, inexpen-
sive, and informal.
Consideration of the preceding factors is not to suggest that limita-
61 W.Wirtz, supra note 22, at 19.
2 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT (TAFT-HARTLEY Acr) § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 1965).
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tions on the admissibility of evidence be abandoned6 3 or that advocates
should refrain from pressing their objections vigorously. The former
has the beneficial value of expediting hearings by precluding the
introduction of irrelevant, immaterial and repetitive evidence, the
latter of directing the arbitrator's attention to deficiencies in the
evidence.
1. Burden of Proof and Burden of Producing Evidence
The term "burden of proof" is often loosely used in arbitration
parlance to refer to: (1) burden of pleading; (2) burden of produc-
ing evidence; (3) burden of persuasion; and (4) standard or quan-
tum of proof.6 4 With two notable exceptions, viz., discharge or dis-
ciplinary and seniority grievances, the burden of proof concept has
little significance in arbitration proceedings. As already noted, tech-
nical pleadings are rarely employed in arbitration and any "burden"
in this regard is meaningless. The burden of producing or going
forward with the evidence, similarly, has little applicability to the
arbitral process. The grieving party normally presents his case first,
but no inference is to be drawn that he is obligated to establish a
prima facie case before the adverse party is obliged to respond. The
order of presentation should be based on how the facts may best be
developed to provide an expeditious and orderly hearing, rather than
on any analogy to established judicial procedure.
In discharge or disciplinary cases, the above pragmatic considera-
63 Three types of evidence of limited value to arbitration might be briefly noted:
compromise offers, admissions, and surprise evidence. Considerations of sound labor-
management relations, rather than the law of evidence, govern the admissibility of such
evidence in arbitration hearings.
As in judicial proceedings, compromise offers are not usually permitted. Interests
other than the merits of the dispute obviously motivate parties to settle cases. In the field
of labor arbitration, disclosure of compromise offers would frustrate settlement of future
grievances and seriously injure the labor-management relationship.
Under certain circumstances, admissions-statements made prior to the hearing in
order to dispute or discredit a claim or defense advanced by the other party-are
vulnerable to similar criticism. It has been suggested that a distinction be drawn between
an admission made by the grievant, in contrast to one made by his representative. It
would appear, however, that the context in which the purported admission occurred,
rather than who made it, is a more valid criterion for determining admissibility. Thus,
an admission made as a part of, or in conjunction with, a compromise offer might not
be permitted as it would tend to discourage future open discussions, whereas admissions
made under other circumstances may be allowed.
Surprise evideince, that is, evidence withheld until the final arbitration step of the
grievance procedure, could be avoided by the use of prehearing procedures. Absent
prehearing, arbitrators very as to their rulings. A few will exclude surprise evidence,
although most appear to admit it. Generally, arbitrators either give less weight to such
evidence or afford the adverse party a continuance to meet the "surprise."
64 R. FLEINwG, supra note 1, at 68-69, 72-73, 77.,
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tions usually require the employer to proceed first with a presenta-
tion of the evidence. Often, this may be the only way in which the
facts can be systematically developed in the record. Unfortunately in
many instances, the evidence serving as the basis of the proceeding
is unavailable to the grievant or his representatives. This lack of
information may be the result of an inadequate grievance procedure
in which the parties fail to investigate and consider matters at the
pre-arbitration stages. The result may stem from the strategy of the
employer to allege vague or multiple grounds for his action with the
intent of choosing the one he considers most persuasive as the hearing
develops, or from an arbitrary refusal on his part to reveal the
grounds. To require the union under such circumstances to proceed
first could result in burdening the record and prolonging the hearing
with unnecessary and irrelevant evidence. The same problem presents
itself in seniority cases wherein a senior employee, without being
informed of the specific facts or reasons, may be bypassed on the
ground that he is not qualified to perform a higher job or, as provided
in some seniority clauses, that he does not possess qualifications
"substantially equal" to that of a junior employee.
The legal concepts of burden of persuasion and quantum of proof
have little practical consequence for most arbitration cases. While
some arbitrators clothe their decisions in the legal jargonisms of "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" or evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt"
or "sufficient to convince a reasonable mind of guilt," the admonition
of the late Dean Shulman that notions of burden of proof are "hardly
applicable to issues of interpretation," 5 or Professor Aaron's more
emphatic observation that the evidentiary concept of most arbitration
cases is "manifestly absurd,"0 6 more nearly accords with the realities
of the arbitration process.
I One particular form of discharge case requires further comment.
Where the discharge involves allegations of moral turpitude or crim-
inal intent, arbitrators frequently observe the more stringent standard
of proof of criminal proceedings, i.e., "proof beyond all reasonable
doubt." Those who argue against this standard emphasize that the
grievant is not being tried "criminally," that even within the law there
are different standards of proof in the civil and criminal courts for
the same offense, and that in any event an arbitration determination is
65 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. .vv. 999,
1018 (1955).
66 Aaron, supra note 1, at 742.
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neither binding upon nor properly admissible in a court of law.
Nevertheless, arbitrators must be sensitive to the social stigma and
the consequential impact of future job jeopardy; hence they are justi-
fied in observing the "same exacting standards of proof that prevail
in criminal proceedings."67' With the exception of cases involving
alleged moral turpitude or criminal intent, it would seem that the
arbitration process is likely to be little enhanced by the adoption of
the judicial concept of "burden of proof."
2. Parol Evidence Rule
Of the numerous exclusionary rules of evidence, probably the
single, most significant and controversial one in arbitration is not
a rule of evidence at all but one of substantive law, i.e., the parol
evidence rule. As formulated by the courts the rule, with certain
exceptions, provides that a complete and integrated contract super-
sedes all prior and contemporaneous negotiations and prohibits the
introduction of any extrinsic evidence, oral or written, to alter or vary
the terms of the written instrument. As articulated and applied by
arbitrators to collective bargaining agreements, the rule is frequently
liberalized to allow the admission of extrinsic evidence in the nature
of statements or conduct of the parties proposed to reform the agree-
ment, to establish a collateral agreement, or to clarify the meaning of
the agreement. "
This rule has little relevancy to interest arbitrations which, by
definition, arise from disagreement between the parties over the in-
clusion of new terms in a collective bargaining contract, and which
are different from grievance or rights arbitrations where the dispute
originates under the existing provisions in a contract. The assertion
that the rule should be applicable to arbitration proceedings is in-
variably advanced by management representatives, who contend
that: (1) The arbitrator is without authority to alter, vary, add to,
or subtract from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement;
and (2) parol evidence may not be admitted or relied upon where the
language is plain and unambiguous. They also assert that even if the
language is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be latent rather than
patent. However, such assertions misconstrue the essence of grievance
or rights arbitration and misconceive the nature of the collective
bargaining process. Except for those cases which involve a factual
67 Id. at 745.
68 See PROBLEmS OF PROOF iN ARBrATiON, supra note 1, at 95-98.
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conflict only, the focal point of the arbitrator's decision-making
process revolves about an interpretation of the contested meaning
of provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Only if it is
presumed that one of the parties is proceeding frivolously or fraud-
ulently can it be concluded that the express language is sufficiently
without "ambiguity" to express "plainly" the mutual intent of the
parties. By its very nature, the core of a grievance or rights dispute,
after resolution of any factual conflict, emanates from equivocacy,
duplicity, or obscurity in the meaning of the words of the agreement.
Thus, grievance or rights arbitration insofar as one of the parties
in good faith advances the contention of ambiguity, intrinsically in-
hibits the strict application of the parol evidence rule.
Indeed, the courts have been troubled by the fact that the parties'
good faith contentions as to the meaning of the language of the
contract simultaneously furnish the ambiguity and give rise to the
application of the rule. The result has been that judges have resorted
to various stratagems to avoid the impact of the rule. Chief Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court in discussing the parol
evidence rule observed that:
Its fatuity is demonstrated by holdings [of the courts] that the
conflicting contentions of the parties as to the meaning of a written
instrument alone supply the ambiguity necessary to take the rule out
of play. ... Litigation as to the meaning of language arises only
from disputes as to meaning; a rule applicable only when no dispute
exists is of no assistance in resolving a dispute that does exist.00
And in the same light, Professor Jones in his scholarly dissertation on
this subject commented:
[T]he appellate courts have had little difficulty in verbally giving
obeisance to the rule while still condoning admission in trials of
parol evidence considered to be reliable in reflecting the actual
rather than the recorded agreement of the parties to a contract.70
Whatever reasons exist for temporizing the rule as an exclusionary
device in judicial proceedings are pluralized in arbitration hearings.
Not uncommonly in the collective bargaining process the provisions
of the contract are agreed upon and drafted under the most un-
09 Laux v. Freed, 53 Cal. 2d 512, 525, 348 P.2d 873, 880, 2 Cal. Rptr. 265, 272-73
(1960) (concurring opinion).
70 Jones, Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations on
Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1241, 1264 (1966).
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toward circumstances-at the culmination of marathon bargaining
sessions, or under the stress of a strike deadline-which are definitely
not conducive to meticulous and precise draftsmanship. Moreover,
while there has been an increased disposition in recent years to
employ skilled professionals for drafting purposes, large numbers of
collective bargaining agreements are still drawn by laymen without
the requisite expertise in this field. Finally, collective bargaining
agreements intrinsically must cover a great variety of industrial
situations, not all of which are foreseeable or existent at the time the
parties execute the agreement. Consequently, the preciseness of con-
tracts in other fields is sometimes lacking.
Two types of parol evidence are usually proffered in the arbitra-
tion hearing to resolve ambiguities in the language: (1) that going
to the history of collective bargaining between the parties, including
prior or contemporaneous negotiations; and (2) that relating to the
parties' past conduct or "past practice" either in interpretation or
application of the agreement. As to the former, the evidence sub-
mitted usually takes the form of prior collective bargaining agree-
ments, written proposals and counter-proposals, minutes of negotia-
tion meetings, and testimony as to oral discussions in such meetings,
The prior written documents, both agreements and formal proposals,
are liberally admitted, since they may be of the greatest assistance
to the arbitrator as background material as well as for elucidation of
the parties' intentions. A rejected or adopted proposal viewed in the
context of prior practices, grievance disputes or rights arbitration may
be highly persuasive if not determinative of the issues involved.
Minutes of negotiation meetings jointly executed or impartially
transcribed may also be helpful, but minutes by one of the parties or
testimony as to what transpired or what was said at negotiation
sessions are generally of little value, as they often suffer from de-
ficiencies in recollection and the usual interspersion of opinion and
self-serving declarations. In every case, the probative value of the
evidence and the pragmatic weighing of its quality against the ex-
pedition of the proceedings should govern the arbitrator in his de-
termination as to admissibility.
Past conduct or past practices also represents one of the major
sources of evidence in arbitration for resolving ambiguities in the
contractual language. Where, for example, a contract provision has
been construed by the parties in a particular manner over the years
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and is included in subsequent agreements, "the language will be
presumed to have the meaning given it by past practice."71 The weight
to be accorded such evidence is, of course, distinct from the question
of its admissibility and has been a subject of substantial dialogue
by arbitrators.72 Suffice it to note here, that the significance to be
ascribed to past conduct or past practice is contingent on several
factors including: whether it was mutual or unilateral, general or
isolated, uniform or varied, active or passive, prolonged or recent,
and whether it was known or reasonably should have been known
to each of the parties.
Parol evidence is generally admitted where there has been a mutual
mistake in the preparation of the agreement. A more complex situa-
tion arises, however, from the allegation advanced by one of the
parties that there is a common understanding evidenced by past
conduct or past practice which amends, modifies or amplifies the
parties' written agreement. Except where the agreement explicitly
provides that all prior agreements are incorporated in the contract
or that all collateral understandings or amendments must be in
writing, arbitrators usually permit the introduction of parol evidence
for such purposes. Nonetheless, they typically require a showing
equivalent to mutual agreement upon the alleged amendment or
modification.
3. Hearsay
Hearsay evidence may be defined as evidence of a statement that
was made other than by the witness testifying at the hearing and that
is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.73 Its value derives
not solely from the credit to be given to the witness upon the stand,
but in part from the veracity and competency of some other person.7
4
The underlying considerations for the exclusion of hearsay evi-
71 F. ELKotJi & E. ELKOURY, How ARBrrRATiON WORKS, at 279 and cases cited
therein (1960).
12 PROBLEMS OF PROOF iw ARBirrATION, supra note 1, at 96, 125, 184-86i 256-57,
291, 293-94.
73 See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966) which provides:
"Hearsay evidence" is evidence of a statement that was made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth
of the matter stated.
See Carantzas v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1956); Northern Trust
Co. v. Moscatelli, 54 Ill. App. 2d 316, 203 N.E. 2d 447 (1964).
7 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 581 (1884); Dennis v. U.S., 302 F.2d 5, 10 (10th
Cir. 1962). See generally Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); Smith
v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 293, 30 P. 529, 532 (1892); Wilcox v. Salomone, 118 Cal.
App. 2d 704, 711, 258 P.2d 845, 850 (1953).
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dence in judicial proceedings are: (1) there is no opportunity to cross-
examine the individual alleged to have made the original statement;
(2) there is a great risk of inaccuracy in the repetition of the story;
(3) it does not permit a person to face his accusers; and (4) it affords
no occasion to the trier of fact to observe the demeanor or manner of
the witness in weighing credibility.7 5 While experience has demon-
strated the unreliability of such evidence, the courts have nevertheless
recognized that its exclusion, particularly where a witness is unable
to testify, has often frustrated rather than facilitated justice. In at-
tempting to balance the multifarious considerations, occasionally the
exceptions have been so expanded and the rule so relaxed, notably
in non-jury trials, as to almost engulf the rule itself.
76
In arbitration proceedings, the practicalities of the labor-manage-
ment relationship compel an even more flexible rule than that some-
times applied in judicial proceedings. Great reliance must be placed
on the discretion and wisdom of the arbitrator. While he may choose
to admit varying forms of hearsay evidence, he should be sensitive
to its deficiencies and plainly articulate his reservations to the parties.
Not infrequently, indication from the arbitrator that "little weight"
will be accorded the hearsay evidence results in the introduction of
primary, probative evidence.
Clearly, due process considerations may counter the acceptance of
hearsay evidence. In any event, however, the arbitrator should not
rely on hearsay alone, and where it is admitted he should require
corroborative evidence to support his decision.
4. Relevance and Materiality
Evidence is relevant if it reasonably tends to prove or disprove any
disputed fact.'7 Additionally, it must bear on a question that is
material to the case.78
75 See generally People v. Bob, 29 Cal. 2d 321, 175 P.2d 12 (1946); Buchanan v.
Nye, 128 Cal. App. 2d 582, 275 P.2d 767 (1954); 19 CAL. JUR. 2d Evidence § 379
at 111 (1954); C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 224 at 457-58 (1954); B.
WmaxrN, CALIFORNIA EVmENCE § 448 at 412-14 (2d ed. 1966).
76 See generally 19 CAL. JuR. 2d Evidence § 383 at 116-118 (1954); C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE, §§ 300-01 at 626-28 (1954) (suggests abolition of hearsay rule in
non-jury cases); B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 474-628 at 436-589 (2d ed.
1966).
77 See, e.g., CAL. EViD. CODE § 210 (West 1966) which provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence, including evidence relevant to the
credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action.
78 Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356 (1901); Roberts v. Permante Corp., 188 Cal.
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The trend of modern court decisions is to admit any evidence that
may have a tendency to throw light on or have any weight in deter-
mination of the issue,79 while leaving the strength of such tendency
or the amount of such weight to be determined by the trier of fact.80
The same considerations are equally apt to the admission of such
evidence in arbitration proceedings. After the arbitrator has the issues
well in hand, he should discourage evidence which is not pertinent to
the resolution of the issues. This must be done, however, in the
context of affording the parties a full and fair hearing, while appre-
ciating the cathartic effect of permitting the parties to air their ire,
and while recognizing that at the time of decision-making he will
fare better to have erred on the side of admitting too much rather
than too little.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is manifest from even this brief review that perplexing proce-
dural questions emanate from the arbitrator's responsibility to accom-
modate individual and institutional interests, while harmonizing the
sometimes divergent precepts of due process and orderly and expedi-
tious hearings. The judicial sanction of arbitration as an integral part
of our national labor policy and the review by state and federal courts,
albeit limited in nature, will inevitably raise further issues.
The acknowledgment by the United States Supreme Court of the
preeminence of the arbitrator in the procedural sphere affords unique
opportunities to the arbitration profession. Unlike the judge who is
constrained by legislatively enacted or judicially promulgated proce-
App. 2d 526, 533, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524 (1961); Hungate v. Hudson, 353 Mo. 944,
185 S.W.2d 646 (1945) (irrelevant or immaterial evidence excluded because its ad-
mission tends to draw the jury's attention away from the issues it has been called to
resolve).
79 See, e.g., Romeo v. Jumbo Market, 247 Adv. Cal. App. 953, 959, 56 Cal. Rptr. 26,
30-31 (1967); Hardwick v. Price, 114 Ga. App. 817, -, 152 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1966);
Brown v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, 70 N.M. 46, -, 369 P.2d 968, 973 (1962).
Some states no longer recognize a distinction between "relevant" and "material"
evidence as shown by Caifornia Evidence Code Section 210, wherein the difinition of
"relevant" evidence apparently engulfs "material" evidence. Under this section, relevant
evidence must tend "to prove or disprove any disputed fact" (relevant) and that fact
must be "of consequence to the determination of the action" (material). B. WiTriN,
CALIFORNIA EvIDENCE § 301 at 265-66 (2d ed. 1966). But cf. Weinstock v. United
States, 231 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
8o People v. Adamson (27 Cal. 2d 478, 485, 486, 165 P.2d 3, 7 (1946); Townsend
v. Gonzalez, 150 Cal. App. 2d 241, 249, 309 P.2d 878, 883-84 (1957); Georgia Say.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Marshall, 207 Ga. 314, 61 S.E.2d 469 (1950); Wilkins v.
Stuecken, 359 Mo. 1047, 225 S.W.2d 131 (1949); Wimberly v. City of Patterson,
75 N.J. Super. 584, 183 A.2d 691 (1962).
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dural rules, and the National Labor Relations Board which is in-
hibited by administrative regulations, the arbitrator is virtually free
to experiment and to improvise in this area. It is to be anticipated that
the arbitrator, with his especial expertise, will adopt and adapt judi-
cial procedures in a manner calculated to improve and perfect the
arbitral process.
